The social brain: neural basis of social knowledge

Social cognition in humans is distinguished by psychological processes that allow us to make inferences about what is going on inside other people—their intentions, feelings, and thoughts. Some of these processes likely account for aspects of human social behavior that are unique, such as our culture and civilization. Most schemes divide social information processing into those processes that are relatively automatic and driven by the stimuli, versus those that are more deliberative and controlled, and sensitive to context and strategy. These distinctions are reflected in the neural structures that underlie social cognition, where there is a recent wealth of data primarily from functional neuroimaging. Here I provide a broad survey of the key abilities, processes, and ways in which to relate these to data from cognitive neuroscience

Neuroscience: who are we?

Writing for the interested public, Gazzaniga marshals recent findings from neuroscience to demonstrate the crucial roles of social interactions and context in the evolution of human mind

What does the amygdala contribute to social cognition?

The amygdala has received intense recent attention from neuroscientists investigating its function at the molecular, cellular, systems, cognitive, and clinical level. It clearly contributes to processing emotionally and socially relevant information, yet a unifying description and computational account have been lacking. The difficulty of tying together the various studies stems in part from the sheer diversity of approaches and species studied, in part from the amygdala's inherent heterogeneity in terms of its component nuclei, and in part because different investigators have simply been interested in different topics. Yet, a synthesis now seems close at hand in combining new results from social neuroscience with data from neuroeconomics and reward learning. The amygdala processes a psychological stimulus dimension related to saliency or relevance; mechanisms have been identified to link it to processing unpredictability; and insights from reward learning have situated it within a network of structures that include the prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum in processing the current value of stimuli. These aspects help to clarify the amygdala's contributions to recognizing emotion from faces, to social behavior toward conspecifics, and to reward learning and instrumental behavior

Processing of the Arousal of Subliminal and Supraliminal Emotional Stimuli by the Human Amygdala

The amygdala is known to play an important role in conscious and unconscious processing of emotional and highly arousing stimuli. Neuroanatomical evidence suggests that the amygdala participates in the control of autonomic responses, such as skin conductance responses (SCRs), elicited by emotionally salient stimuli, but little is known regarding its functional role in such control. We investigated this issue by showing emotional visual stimuli of varying arousal to patients with left (n = 12), right (n = 8), and bilateral (n = 3) amygdala damage and compared their results with those from 38 normal controls. Stimuli were presented both subliminally (using backward masking) and supraliminally under lateralized presentation to one visual hemifield. We collected SCRs as a physiological index of emotional responses. Subjects subsequently rated each stimulus on valence and arousal under free viewing conditions. There were two key findings: (1) impaired overall SCR after right amygdala damage; and (2) impaired correlation of SCR with the rated arousal of the stimuli after left amygdala damage. The second finding was strengthened further by finding a positive correlation between the evoked SCR magnitude and postsurgery amygdala volume, indicating impaired autonomic responses with larger tissue damage. Bilateral amygdala damage resulted in severe impairments on both of the above measures. Our results provide support for the hypothesis that the left and right amygdalae subserve different functions in emotion processing: the left may decode the arousal signaled by the specific stimulus, whereas the right may provide a global level of autonomic activation triggered automatically by any arousing stimulus

Impaired judgments of sadness but not happiness following bilateral amygdala damage

Although the amygdala's role in processing facial expressions of fear has been well established, its role in the processing of other emotions is unclear. In particular, evidence for the amygdala's involvement in processing expressions of happiness and sadness remains controversial. To clarify this issue, we constructed a series of morphed stimuli whose emotional expression varied gradually from very faint to more pronounced. Five morphs each of sadness and happiness, as well as neutral faces, were shown to 27 subjects with unilateral amygdala damage and 5 with complete bilateral amygdala damage, whose data were compared to those from 12 brain-damaged and 26 normal controls. Subjects were asked to rate the intensity and to label the stimuli. Subjects with unilateral amygdala damage performed very comparably to controls. By contrast, subjects with bilateral amygdala damage showed a specific impairment in rating sad faces, but performed normally in rating happy faces. Furthermore, subjects with right unilateral amygdala damage performed somewhat worse than subjects with left unilateral amygdala damage. The findings suggest that the amygdala's role in processing of emotional facial expressions encompasses multiple negatively valenced emotions, including fear and sadness

Conceptual Challenges and Directions for Social Neuroscience

Social neuroscience has been enormously successful and is making major contributions to fields ranging from psychiatry to economics. Yet deep and interesting conceptual challenges abound. Is social information processing domain specific? Is it universal or susceptible to individual differences and effects of culture? Are there uniquely human social cognitive abilities? What is the “social brain,” and how do we map social psychological processes onto it? Animal models together with fMRI and other cognitive neuroscience approaches in humans are providing an unprecedented level of detail and many surprising results. It may well be that social neuroscience in the near future will give us an entirely new view of who we are, how we evolved, and what might be in store for the future of our species

How should neuroscience study emotions? By distinguishing emotion states, concepts, and experiences

In this debate with Lisa Feldman Barrett, I defend a view of emotions as biological functional states. Affective neuroscience studies emotions in this sense, but it also studies the conscious experience of emotion (‘feelings’), our ability to attribute emotions to others and to animals (‘attribution’, ‘anthropomorphizing’), our ability to think and talk about emotion (‘concepts of emotion’, ‘semantic knowledge of emotion’) and the behaviors caused by an emotion (‘expression of emotions’, ‘emotional reactions’). I think that the most pressing challenge facing affective neuroscience is the need to carefully distinguish between these distinct aspects of ‘emotion’. I view emotion states as evolved functional states that regulate complex behavior, in both people and animals, in response to challenges that instantiate recurrent environmental themes. These functional states, in turn, can also cause conscious experiences (feelings), and their effects and our memories for those effects also contribute to our semantic knowledge of emotions (concepts). Cross-species studies, dissociations in neurological and psychiatric patients, and more ecologically valid neuroimaging designs should be used to partly separate these different phenomena

Human Lesion Studies in the 21st Century

The study of patients with brain lesions has made major historical contributions to cognitive neuroscience. Here I argue for an increased investment in modern lesion mapping, complementing fMRI studies and laying the conceptual and analytic foundations for future techniques that could experimentally manipulate human brain function

The Biology of Fear

Each of us has felt afraid, and we can all recognize fear in many animal species. Yet there is no consensus in the scientific study of fear. Some argue that ‘fear’ is a psychological construct rather than something discoverable through scientific investigation. Others argue that the term ‘fear’ cannot properly be applied to animals because we cannot know whether they feel afraid. Studies in rodents show that there are highly specific brain circuits for fear, whereas findings from human neuroimaging seem to make the opposite claim. Here, I review the field and urge three approaches that could reconcile the debates. For one, we need a broadly comparative approach that would identify core components of fear conserved across phylogeny. This also pushes us towards the second point of emphasis: an ecological theory of fear that is essentially functional. Finally, we should aim even to incorporate the conscious experience of being afraid, reinvigorating the study of feelings across species